by Tapio Kanninen, 24 February 2023
Prof Roy Lee, a former Director at the UN Legal Department invited me to talk about the peace plan for Ukraine Prof Heikki Patomaki and I published in Le Monde Diplomatique in January. He said: “The more people talk about it the more likelihood of getting your idea considered” (see the invitation below).
On 21 February I made a half an hour presentation and then we had an hour or so discussion with some dozen attendees, mostly former faculty members and graduate students. I started with a Finnish experience with the Soviets. From 1920s and 1930s hostility, and two lost wars in WWII (we lost some 20% of our territory) the relationship changed suddenly from hostility to friendship, to “Finlandization”, and increased economic relationship that helped the Finnish economy, and all these changed relationships made ultimately the Finns the happiest people in the world, five times in a row. I explained that it was our President Juho Kusti Paasikivi’s visionary policy that friendly relations with the top leadership in the Kremlin would bring the best benefits for the Finns and at the same time block any communists’ coup d’etat efforts.
With regard to Ukraine’s present strong desire to fight, the lessons from our WWII wars were a bit similar. The Finnish population also got used to good news from the battlefield and strongly objected to the peace deals that the military and political leadership eventually made with the Soviets (as the top leadership saw it as the only way to preserve Finnish independence). In his early presidency President Zelensky was also open with a peace deal with Russia but his own party strongly objected. I concluded, however, that the Finnish lessons could not easily be applied in solving the Ukraine war as countries are too different in so many respects. Better example on how to bring peace to Ukraine, with a population divided by territorial claims, ethnicity, religion, history and language, is the Middle East. And most importantly, in solving the three major wars in the area, the Suez Crisis, Six Day War and Yom Kippur War, the UN had a major role in solving the conflict through ceasefire resolutions in the Security Council and peace-keeping operations on the ground: UNTSO, UNEF I and II, UNDOF and UNIFIL.
The similarities of the Ukraine war and Middle East wars also apply to the peace mediators. In all major wars in the Middle East American contribution to peace was absolutely essential. Both Ukraine and Israel are almost totally dependent on the economic and military aid from the US and the US president can, if there is a political will, bring peace to Ukraine as well. While everyone of us strongly condemns the flagrant violation of the UN Charter by the Russian invasion, the US contribution as a leader of the West to end the war (in other ways than militarily) has not so far been helpful. Israel Prime Minister Naftali Bennett was relatively close to a peace agreement but later said in an interview that the West blocked it (or stopped it depending on the translation) which he thought was a mistake. Even closer was the peace deal in Turkey in April 2022. According to pro-government “Ukrainska Pravda” British Prime Minister Boris Johnson made on 9th of April a surprise visit to Ukraine and told President Zelensky two things: Ukraine should not negotiate with a war criminal and even if Zelensky would like to make concessions to President Putin – such as a neutral status of Ukraine which Zelensky evidently was seriously considering – the West is not ready to end the war. The peace negotiations collapsed soon thereafter.
I presented the argument that the Europeans – France, Germany, OSCE as well as Ukraine, the separatists leaders and Russia – wanted to make peace in Ukraine through MInsk I and II agreements without any UN involvement. But the OSCE observation peace mission was too weak and inexperienced to facilitate the agreement. OSCE’s only similar experience has been in Kosovo while the UN has over 70 years experience in peace-keeping, demilitarization, disengagement, peace building/nation building and even in military style robust peacekeeping while the OSCE does not. Ambassador Heikki Talvitie who has been Co-Chair of OSCE Minsk Conference in 1995-96 has said that the Organization is basically controlled by the West, Russia is isolated and cannot expect there an even-handed treatment. But the Russians and Ukrainians were also frustrated by the OSCE mission’s performance in the Minsk process. Russia proposed a UN peacekeeping mission to protect it and Ukraine UN Chapter VII peace enforcement operation.
The Chair, Prof Lee, asked Larry Johnson, who has been teaching at Columbia Law School, to make first comments. In addition to his teaching role, Johnson who was recruited from the Harvard Law School to the UN and spent some 35 years in various UN legal entities, served his last two years as Assistant Secretary-General in the UN Office of Legal affairs. He has also been drafting legal documents for peacekeeping missions and related tribunals. Johnson very much liked the presentation in the sense that it highlighted the UN’s almost totally forgotten potential to be used in the Ukraine war’s final settlements. It would be important to elaborate the UN’s potential peacemaking and peacekeeping role in some detail and spread this message around. When the time is ripe the UN elaborated peace plans are ready to be applied to a final settlement. Prof Lee then suggested that when Dr Georgios Kostakos, CEO of the Foundation for Global Governance and Sustainability, and Bertie Ramcharan, former ASG and acting High Commissioner for Human Rights with extensive experience in peace negotiations in the former Yugoslavia, come to New York – as they both have indicated to do so and are interested in bringing the Le Monde Diplomatique article ideas forward – we could have a further roundtable on these issues.
In the further discussion it was also debated how to make sure that in any peace deal Russia is not rewarded for the invasion. I responded that if a UN Transitional Administration is established in the occupied areas that does not reward Russia. While there are different views on what Russians’ original and later goals were at least on one there is a consensus: Russia wanted establish a friendly government in Kiev. That would not happen in case of UN peacekeepers being brought to Ukraine for demilitarisation, peace enforcement and election monitoring and if the negotiations start on the final status of the occupied areas administered by the UN. The UN peacekeepers also work as a shield that prevents any new invasion in the foreseeable future, a much discussed fear in the West. Ukraine instead is mightily rewarded as a massive reconstruction effort and economic aid from all around the world will immediately start whenever realistic and enforceable peace plans within the UN framework are emerging.
Larry Johnson also raised the issue of accountability. Vladimir Putin and his lieutenants have to be brought to justice with their flagrant violation of the UN charter and war crimes. A new “Aggression Tribunal”, based on the precedent of the Nuremberg trials, might be a way forward. But how could Russia, a permanent member of the Security Council, realistically participate in setting up such a tribunal. Full amnesty would not be an option. I volunteered to present an “ultra-realism solution”. A peace deal should offer language that such negotiations will start, and also include language for reparations from Russia, but in practice such negotiations might linger for decades until all culprits have already passed away. But in any case the principle of accountability has been established.
The question was asked why countries like India and Brazil do not condemn the Russian invasion and try to stay as outsiders. In my presentation I had said that there are two narratives in the West on who are the ultimate culprits for the war. The overwhelming majority view is that President Putin is to be blamed only. The minority view says that the threat of NATO expansion to Ukraine was a major contributing factor to the Russian invasion and the war is basically a proxy war between the US and Russia for larger hegemony in the world. I also said that both narratives have to be taken into account in seeking a peaceful resolution to the conflict. Brazil and India as well as many other developing countries see the war in this broader perspective and are also recalling various US invasions without UN authorization. This view is often condemned and ridiculed in the West as “whataboutism” but is a fact of life in many parts of the South.
Another question was asked about potential use of tactical nuclear weapons in Ukraine. In my presentation I had compared the decisions President Kennedy had to take in the Cuban Missile Crisis – when forcefully military challenged by the Soviet Union in the US sphere of influence – and what President Putin might face if countering a total military defeat and humiliation. The options presented to President included “do nothing” – as Secretary of Defence McNamara claimed that the nuclear weapons balance has not changed – and two diplomatic solutions. But Kennedy decided for blockade which contained a very high risk of nuclear war as – he later said – “it [doing nothing] would have politically changed the balance of power. It would have appeared to, and appearances contribute to reality.” So nuclear superpower cannot apprear to be weak if strongly military challenged and can make ultimatums which involve nuclear strikes if the other side is not backing off. This same situation might apply to President Putin if he is facing a total defeat militarily – and the Americans know this and and try to avoid such a humiliating defeat.
Finally, I presented as a way to start concretely the peace process through a TRACK II kind of “mapping exercise” to find out through confidential and informal discussions in the UN Missions of major parties of the conflict as well at the UN Headquarters and agencies in New York where the areas of possible openness to further talks might appear, such as is to consider the use of the UN peace operations on the ground and measures to prevent accidental or intentional nuclear exchange. This would be followed by series of seminars to study more the prospects of a peace settlement. As the presentation included many new ideas no direct comments on the proposal were made but Prof Lee said after the seminar that the sucess will hinge on the question would the mapping exercise gain some influential backers and thus open the necessary doors.