The imperative of de-escalation in Ukraine: negotiations and possible solutions.
By Tapio Kanninen and Heikki Patomäki, first published in Katoikos.world on 29 November, 2022
In the West, there are two different competing narratives about the war in Ukraine. The prevailing narrative is that it is a struggle between the “bad guys” and “good guys”. For many, Russia led by dictator Putin represents imperialism and is alone responsible for this unprovoked war, whereas Ukraine represents freedom and democracy as well as courage and heroism. The forces of evil must be won decisively by military means. The likelihood of a nuclear conflict is played down as it would lessen the resolve to reach a total victory.
If the Ukraine war is seen through moral prescriptions, as a struggle between good and evil, like in ancient Manichean thinking, we approach a very dangerous territory in the world of nuclear weapons. Russians have their own version of demonization, with an opposite view on locating the good and the evil. In this black-and-white, moralistic environment, only a few peace proposals have been presented while actors resort to increasingly harsh military measures, stricter sanctions and further escalation of conflict. Generals have become the oracles of the future and politicians and diplomats their servants. Is this really the future we want?
The minority or at least the less vocal view in the West is that reality is much more complicated than what the majority suggests. The unfortunate and short-sighted Russian invasion violates international law and has caused an enormous amount of suffering and turmoil, for the directly warring sides, for Europe, the US and the world, but this invasion was not unprovoked. While there are different ways of articulating the specifics of the narrative, this storyline involves the idea that also the West and the US in particular bear partial responsibility for the tragic outcome of the long process of mutual alienation and escalation of conflict between Russia and the West.[1]
What is more, the escalation has continued to a point where the world is verging on nuclear war. Nothing can justify a nuclear war and yet humankind is now becoming close to the bmoment of the Cuban Missile Crisis, through brinkmanship and escalation. Nuclear war will be on the horizon unless a peaceful solution is found. China’s president Xi Jinping’s early November plea to stop making threats and prevent the use of nuclear weapons in Europe and Asia may have eased the rhetoric temporarily but is no substitute for the de-escalation of the conflict itself.
The proponents of the first narrative may respond that it is impossible to negotiate in good faith with the Putin regime. The point of ever more extensive military aid to Ukraine and deeper sanctions against Russia is also to undermine the Putin regime in the hope of the emergence of a more peaceful and democratic government in Russia. However, a coup d’état or a sudden revolution of some sort would likely lead to a destabilization of the Russian state, economy, and society. It is not only that we may be seeing a kind of return to the chaotic 1990s but there is also a possibility of dissolution of central political authority and fragmentation, civil strife, even war.
Many Western politicians and the bulk of media people seem to be thinking that the harder the sanctions the better because that will lead to some kind of a breakdown of the Russian economy leading to a regime change. But apart from the fact that the sanctions do not seem to be working the intended way, they hardly consider the consequences. Assuming a breakdown, even if someone would be able to again stabilize the situation in Russia, it is quite likely that the successor system will be a dictatorship, as the army and police are among the few coherent institutions that can keep the huge country from falling apart. Moreover, any loss of central control of Russia’s nuclear weapons would have nightmarish consequences.
Already during the Cold War, many researchers argued that the main danger lies in a situation, which is preceded by a steady erosion of trust and confidence. In this kind of scenario, a crisis may precipitate the first use of nuclear weapons, particularly if the initiator faces a desperate situation and believes that only nuclear weapons might provide an escape from certain defeat and death.[2]
The uncertainties and risks of the current situation have become increasingly blatant. Thus, while President Biden has criticized the Russian invasion harshly from the start, and including in his address to the UN General Assembly on 21 September 2022, the lessons of the Cuban Missile Crisis of the early 1960s seem to have started to resonate at the White House after mid-September. In his address at a fundraising dinner on September 29th Biden put forward some poking questions: “We’re trying to figure out: What is Putin’s off-ramp?” “Where, where does he get off? Where does he find a way out? Where does he find himself in a position that he does not — not only lose face but lose significant power within Russia?”
According to the New York Times[3], the main message that Mr. Biden seemed to be conveying is that he was heeding one of the central lessons of the Cuban Missile Crisis, which unfolded in October 1962. That lesson is that the United States and its allies need to avoid getting Mr. Putin’s back to the wall, forcing him to strike out. “It’s part of Russian doctrine”, he explained to the well-heeled crowd of potential donors to Democratic senatorial campaigns, that “if the motherland is threatened, they’ll use whatever force they need, including nuclear weapons.” This implies an understanding that if the Russians face continuous battlefield victories by NATO-assisted Ukrainian forces, the war will be in a political and military stalemate, where a nuclear strike becomes more and more likely, especially if the leaders’ political and physical survival is at risk.
The White House’s insistence that if Putin uses tactical nuclear weapons the US will respond “with catastrophic consequences” does not help defuse the approaching Armageddon. We do not know what these consequences mean in practice but General Petraeus, former CIA Director, has suggested striking Russian forces, installations and the Black Sea Fleet, destroying them completely with massive conventional arms. But that would be brinkmanship of the highest order. An attack against Russian forces by NATO countries allows or even might force Russia, according to its stated nuclear policy, to launch intercontinental ballistic missiles in return.
In 1962, after having vetoed various strike options proposed by the military – that we now know would have started a nuclear holocaust – President Kennedy eventually proposed a secret deal that was accepted by Soviet First Secretary Nikita Khrushchev. Kennedy suggested removing US nuclear missiles from Turkey secretly if Soviet missiles were removed from Cuba, publicly under UN monitoring. In addition, the US made a public declaration to not invade Cuba again.
During the Cuban crisis, President Kennedy estimated the probability of a nuclear war to be somewhere between one in three and one in two, while other participants in the crisis thought the probability was somewhat lower. Sixty years later, in 2022, we have already seen estimates that the probability of a nuclear war is approaching the heights of the 1962 crisis. For example, in October 2022, Matthew Bunn, Professor of the Practice of Energy, National Security, and Foreign Policy at the Harvard Kennedy School, estimated that the probability of the war in Ukraine turning nuclear is 10-20%.[4] These levels of likelihood are unacceptable. Former US Senator Sam Nunn “has also been sounding the alarm about the threat of an accidental nuclear exchange as a result of a cyber-attack on nuclear command-and-control systems — including by malign actors not directly involved in the conflict who could be confused for a nuclear adversary”[5].
The Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI), a respected international institution established by Senator Nunn and Ted Turner, has for a long time advocated disarmament measures and military confidence-building measures. In face of the increasing escalation potential of the conflict in Ukraine, NTI published on 18 March 2022 a hypothetical scenario of how the world could plunder, unintentionally, into full-scale nuclear war through miscalculation and misinformation under the enormous pressure of the war, including mental and physical stress and sleep deprivation[6]. Numerous war games by the US department of defense and independent research institutions have also simulated the world moving unintentionally to nuclear war in hypothetical scenarios of war-like conditions between the US and Russia. And accidents become more likely when the war is prolonged as it is happening right now.
How to ensure in this dangerous situation that the nuclear war does not start intentionally or accidentally? The prospects are not promising because of the almost complete loss of trust and communication between Russia and NATO. In December 2020, a high-level group of 166 former generals, politicians, ex-diplomats and academics from the US, Europe and Russia, all concerned about increasing risks of nuclear and other military accidents, signed a report entitled ‘Recommendations of the Expert Dialogue on NATO-Russia Military Risk Reduction in Europe’[7]. The talks continued in a smaller group but unfortunately have essentially been moribund after the Russian invasion of Ukraine.
In this serious situation of potential nuclear escalation, the UN Secretary-General could resort to a rarely used leadership measure the founders of the UN Charter endowed to him: the use of Article 99 of the Charter[8]. The Article says that the Secretary-General can “to bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter which in his opinion may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security.” It is in fact difficult to imagine a more urgent and appropriate use of Article 99 than the increased risk of nuclear war in Ukraine. Secretary-General Antonia Guterres has himself said that nuclear tensions are climbing to dangerous levels in his speech at a UN Alliance of Civilizations meeting in Morocco in November 2022.[9] Nuclear Threat Initiative could brief the Council, officially or informally, about the increased risks and propose that the seven recommendations by the NATO-Russia Nuclear Risk talks referred to above should be implemented to the maximum degree possible and official disarmament talks should also be urgently resumed.
We also believe in a nearly absolute and unconditional requirement to de-escalate the conflict through negotiations. This is a war between Russia and Ukraine, with intensive NATO involvement and with long-deteriorating US-Russia relations looming in the background. Any peace agreement must be negotiated by the relevant participants and with appropriate third parties.
On 11 November 2022, the Foundation for Global Governance and Sustainability issued a Call for Armistice in Ukraine. So far five heads of State of Government have co-signed it.[10] The initiative asks for a transition from a general cease-fire to a final peace settlement between Russia and Ukraine which is to be supervised by the United Nations and possibly other international organizations, such as the OSCE. Demilitarization of the occupied areas and a larger demilitarized zone of disengagement between the armed forces of the belligerents could be a part of a wider agreement. The plan also calls for immediate efforts to be focused on repairing civilian infrastructure, including in the areas to be placed under temporary international administration, and on securing an adequate supply of food, water, health care, and energy for the inhabitants.
This is an example of a constructive proposal that stresses the role of common institutions and goes beyond thinking in terms of simple territorial concessions either way. In particular, the option of using the United Nations’ presence in Ukraine is an already much-tested model for the de-escalation of the war and building the elements for peace. Instead of seeing the conflict as a mythic struggle between good and evil, what is needed is a sense of nuance, context, and reciprocal process. The reliance on common institutions and especially the potential of the UN presence on the ground as a tool for de-escalation would be a step in the right direction – even if only a small step in the long march toward a more sustainable and desirable future.
[1] For discussions on this point, see Tuomas Forsberg and Heikki Patomäki, Debating the War in Ukraine. Counterfactual Histories and Future Possibilities, Abingdon and New York: Routledge, forthcoming in Dec 2022.
[2] Rudolf Avenhaus, Steven J. Brams, John Fichtner and D. Marc Kilgour, ‘The Probability of Nuclear War’, Journal of Peace Research, 1989, Vol. 26, No. 1, p. 91.
[3] David E Sanger, “In Dealing with Putin Threat, Biden Turns to Lessons of Cuban Missile Crisis”, New York Times, October 7th, 2022.
[4] View expressed in an NPR interview on 4 October 2022, summary available at https://www.npr.org/2022/10/04/1126680868/putin-raises-the-specter-of-using-nuclear-weapons-in-his-war-with-ukraine.
[5] Bryan Bender, “How the Ukraine War Could Go Nuclear”, Politico, 24 March 2022.
[6] Christopher Coletta, “Blundering into a Nuclear War in Ukraine; a Hypothetical Scenario”, Atomic Pulse, Nuclear Threat Initiative, 18 March 2022. Available at https://www.nti.org/atomic-pulse/blundering-into-a-nuclear-war-in-ukraine-a-hypothetical-scenario/.
[7] European Leadership Network, “Recommendations from an experts’ dialogue; de-escalating NATO-Russia military risks”, 6 December 2020. Available at https://www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/group-statement/nato-russia-military-risk-reduction-in-europe/
[8] See Tapio Kanninen and Heikki Talvitie,” How to Move the UN Security Council from Hostility to Cooperation”, PassBlue, 22 November 2022, Available at https://www.passblue.com/2022/11/21/how-to-move-from-hostility-to-cooperation-in-the-un-security-council/.
For the history of the use of Article 99 see https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2019-08/in-hindsight-article-99-and-providing-the-security-council-with-early-warning.php
[9] “UN Chief: Nuclear tensions climbing to dangerous levels”, Global Affairs, SmartBrief, 23 November 2022.
[10] The Call is available at https://www.foggs.org/armistice-call-11-nov-2022/.
Is a new confidence-building architecture possible as a response to the Ukraine crisis?
By Tapio Kanninen and Georgios Kostakos*, first published in Katoikos.world on 25 March, 2022
After the Russian invasion of Ukraine that started on 24 February 2022, the world was horrified at the prospect of a new major war in Europe. Condemnation for the invasion rightly goes to President Vladimir Putin of Russia. An overblown Western reaction, though, may have dangerous consequences for the future of the whole international order, among other things increasing the likelihood of accidental nuclear war and undermining the urgency of combatting catastrophic global warming.
How we got to where we are now
The reaction of the West to the invasion of Ukraine has concentrated on imposing severe sanctions and other restrictions on Putin and Russia. The aim is clear: to inflict maximum pain on the Russian population and oligarchs. The West tries to isolate Russia and strengthen NATO, pushing for the latter’s rapid enlargement. Such attitudes clearly emanate from the old Cold War mentality of preventing the Soviet Union from spreading communism around the world. To that end, NATO was initially established as a nuclear umbrella to deter any Soviet attack on the European allies. Pushing for increased military budgets is also a way of containing Russia. But Russia is not promoting communism anymore. Rather, it has historically been concerned about invaders like the Mongols, Poland, Napoleon, and Hitler. It may look irrational from a Western point of view, but for Russian leaders and a part of the Russian population, the NATO expansion that started when the Soviet Union was dismantled constitutes an existential threat.
George F. Kennan, the architect of US containment policy against Russian expansion during the Cold War and the Marshall Plan, expressed Russian fears of invasion in this way: At the “bottom of the Kremlin’s neurotic view of world affairs is the traditional and instinctive Russian sense of insecurity”. During the Soviet Union’s time Eastern European and the Baltic States gave Russia a buffer zone against potential invaders but when the Soviet Union broke up that buffer was lost. The West and the Clinton Administration used this situation to the West’s military and security advantage expanding NATO to Poland, Hungary, the Baltic States, and beyond. Kennan strongly objected to this expansion, as he thought it would start a new Cold War with Russia. NATO expansion was in his mind “Strategic blunder of potentially epic proportions”.
When Russia is portrayed as an eternal enemy and Putin and other Kremlin leaders as evil, the countermeasures against the Ukraine invasion could easily be overblown, increasing over time the likelihood of nuclear war and use of other weapons of mass deduction unless some confidence-building measures are put in place. While this is happening, other major challenges remain unattended. Thus, catastrophic global warming becomes much more likely – an existential threat to all humanity – as defense rather than climate action budgets are increased during a period of negative, slow, or zero economic growth. Moreover, reliance on fossil fuels including domestically extracted coal, which was supposed to be phased out, is seen as necessary in reducing dependence on Russian gas and fighting inflation. Europe’s transformation to a green economy will take even longer, it now seems, too long compared to the urgent need for climate action.
Lessons (not) learned
After two world wars, humankind learned that after large-scale carnage and humanitarian suffering, there should be a sincere effort to build a new international architecture based on collective security and cooperation. While the Russian invasion of Ukraine is not comparable to World War I or II, as of the date of writing of this article at least, tens of thousands have already been killed or wounded. The war has also had devastating effects in terms of millions of refugees and internally displaced persons, increased inflation, and rising food prices threatening to create massive hunger in many countries.
Inside Russia too the effects of sanctions and isolation are expected to be catastrophic and will likely increase poverty, misery, humiliation, resentment, and hatred against the West. This can only lead to escalation, as the Russians have the means to exact revenge if relations between Russia and the West continue to deteriorate: nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons and cyber-attacks against Western institutions and businesses. We have to remember how the bitterness felt by the Germans after the Versailles Treaty’s harsh peace terms in 1919 made possible Hitler’s path to power.
The Finnish model of dealing with Russia
It should not be so difficult to start thinking in ways that will eventually build cooperation and trust between Russia, Europe, and the US. To do so – to think differently on peace, security, and cooperation – we have to take some lessons from history. The Finnish-Soviet Winter War of 1939-40 bears significant resemblance to the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Like Ukraine, Finland has a long border with Russia, with the Russian city of St Petersburg just 20 miles from the border. Historically, Russia has feared an attack from the Baltic Sea and through Lapland. After the German invasion of Poland, Stalin asked Finland to give some strategic areas to the Soviet Union to ensure protection of St Petersburg and other Russian strategic interests from an enemy invasion. Following Finland’s refusal, Stalin started the Winter War against Finland in late 1939. The Soviet Union had two wars with Finland during the WWII period. It could not occupy the whole country, though, and Finland remained independent although it lost parts of its territory.
After WWII and based on the lessons of the two wars that Finland fought with the Soviet Union during that period, two Finnish Presidents, Juho Paasikivi and Urho Kekkonen developed a new doctrine of cooperation and friendship with an old enemy, mostly for geopolitical reasons. The doctrine included some self-censorship to avoid provoking the Soviet Union. This policy of « Finlandization » was condemned and ridiculed in the West. It has contributed, though, to good relations between Finland and the Soviet Union, as well as Russia, and has made the Finns feel secure until this date. In fact, the Finns were found to be the happiest people in the world in the 2021 survey, for the fifth year in a row. President Zelensky of Ukraine did not have at all a mindset of Finlandization before the Russian invasion and some observers have characterized his behavior as provocative. It was reported that President Macron raised Finlandization as one model for Ukraine but was strongly criticized and the concept did not appear anymore in his talks. In fact, in 2014 Henry Kissinger had publicly suggested Finlandization as a good option for Ukraine.
Building confidence in Europe, in the late 1960s and 1970s and now
Another lesson from history is how a visionary foreign policy of a country can turn a security threat into a confidence-building process, which is how the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe started. After the tensions created by the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 and in view of other problems in its satellite countries, the Soviet Union suggested in 1969 to European countries that a Conference on Security should be convened. This suggestion put Finland in a difficult position. Rejection would create a problem in its sensitive relationship with Russia. Finland decided to put forward its own initiative proposing Helsinki as venue for the Conference, adding both economic and humanitarian cooperation to its agenda, and inviting also the US and Canada to participate.
There was strong criticism against the Finnish proposal from many sides but gradually the initiative gathered strength and the Conference was held in Helsinki in 1975. The result was reduced tension in Europe and between the US and the Soviet Union. The OSCE that resulted from it has grown to be the world’s largest security-oriented regional organization active in peace missions, electoral monitoring, and other fields. Among other positive effects, human rights monitoring got a major boost through this process.
In December 2021 President Putin issued a list of security guarantees Russia needed to reduce tension and solve the perceived problems in Ukraine. Moreover, Russia asked for new security arrangements with NATO and the US. These demands were rejected by the West. While in many ways different from the Soviet Union’s initiative in 1969, in both cases the question was about geopolitical stability and security.
Sooner or later we should change our mindset from thinking about military threats and solutions imposed with the power of arms and sanctions to promoting cooperation, security, and stability in international relations in general and in Europe in particular. If a country or an international organization proposes a new process for peace and cooperation – like Finland did in the early 1970s – this time China should be part of it as well. In terms of topics, a process for cooperation, security, and stability should definitely include the prevention of accidental nuclear war and climate change mitigation and adaptation. To propose a viable new confidence-building arrangement in response to the Ukraine crisis would require a lot of boldness and creativity. It should include a real departure from relying primarily on military guarantees and power balances to safeguard peace and security and should include provisions for addressing non-military threats to human security too.
*Dr. Tapio Kanninen, former Chief of Policy Planning at the UN’s Department of Political Affairs in New York, is a member of the Advisory Board of the Foundation for Global Governance and Sustainability (FOGGS). He is also currently President of the Global Crisis Information Network Inc. and a founding member of Climate Leadership Coalition Inc. His latest book is Crisis of Global Sustainability (2013). While at the UN Tapio also served as Head of the Secretariat of Kofi Annan’s five Summits with Regional Organizations that also included military alliances like NATO.
*Dr. Georgios Kostakos is Executive Director of the Brussels-based Foundation for Global Governance and Sustainability (FOGGS). He has been extensively involved in global governance, sustainability, and climate-related activities with the United Nations and beyond. The starting point for the work of FOGGS is the need for a new Grand Narrative for a fair, human-centered, and inclusive globalization. One of its projects is the UN2100 Initiative for UN reform, which includes the proposal to establish a Global Resilience Council to effectively address non-military threats to human security like climate change and pandemics.
Is a new confidence-building architecture and fundamental UN reform possible as a response to the Ukraine crisis?
By Tapio Kanninen and Georgios Kostakos (*) , first published in Other-News.info on 26 May, 2022
Condemnation of the Russian invasion of Ukraine is rightly aimed at President Vladimir Putin. As if starting a war against a sovereign country was not enough, there is the added chock of the atrocities committed by Russian troops against Ukrainian civilians. However, an overblown Western reaction will have dangerous consequences for the future of the whole international order, increasing greatly the likelihood of a generalized war even with the use of nuclear weapons, a nuclear accident, and run-away global threats, notably climate change.
The West has imposed severe sanctions on Russia inflicting maximum pain on the Russian leadership, the oligarchs and the population at large. While this is understandable as an initial response, ideally to prevent rogue behaviour, it is questionable whether it will have the intended impact after certain time has passed, or it may make the Russian behaviour even more rogue and unhinged. The Western sanctions rekindle the sense of persecution and victimhood that goes deep into the Russian psyche. There are some good reasons for that, as historically Russia has suffered in the hands of powerful invaders like the Mongols, Poland, Napoleon and Hitler.
George F. Kennan, the architect of US containment policy and the Marshall Plan, expressed Russian fears of invasion in this way: “At the bottom of the Kremlin’s neurotic view of world affairs is the traditional and instinctive Russian sense of insecurity.” During the Soviet Union era Eastern European and Baltic States gave Russia a buffer zone against potential invaders, but when the Soviet Union broke up that buffer was lost. Successive US governments used this situation to the West’s military advantage expanding NATO. Kennan strongly objected to that, as he thought it would start a new Cold War with Russia. NATO expansion was in his mind “Strategic blunder of potentially epic proportions”. Whether such a reaction seems irrational or not from a Western point of view, NATO expansion is perceived as an existential threat by those sitting in the Kremlin.
The effects of the Ukraine war have already been catastrophic. Tens of thousands have been killed or wounded with millions of refugees, increased inflation and rising food prices. Inside Russia too sanctions and isolation are increasing poverty, misery, humiliation, resentment and hatred against the West. Despite apparent setbacks on the ground, the Russians have the means to exact revenge if relations between Russia and the West continue to deteriorate: nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and cyber-attacks. We have to remember how the bitterness felt by the Germans after the Versailles Treaty’s harsh peace terms in 1919 made possible Hitler’s path to power.
After two world wars, humankind has learned that large scale carnage and humanitarian suffering need to be followed by a sincere effort to build a new international architecture based on collective security and cooperation. In his strong address to the UN Security Council on 5 April 2022 President Zelensky called for a fundamental reform (or dissolution) of the UN as collective security does not work. Indeed, Article 109 of the UN Charter provides for a General Conference of the Members of the United Nations to review the Charter at the latest ten years after it entered into force, that is by 1955, which did not happen. 77 years letter, such a review of the UN Charter is long overdue and urgently needed, even if politically fraught with difficulties. A much more practical, parallel effort would be to start a confidence-building process in Europe and the world, to (re)establish the required minimum level of mutual trust for peace and cooperation to take hold. History shows us how that kind of process could be initiated.
The Finnish-Soviet Winter War of 1939-40 bears significant resemblance to the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Finland has a long border with Russia. Historically, Russia has feared an attack from the Baltic Sea. After the German invasion of Poland, Stalin asked Finland to give some areas to the Soviet Union to ensure protection of Russian strategic interests but Finland refused. Stalin started a war, which led to Finland’s losing parts of its territory but the Soviet Army could not occupy the whole country.
After WWII two Finnish Presidents, Juho Paasikivi and Urho Kekkonen developed a doctrine of cooperation and friendship with the old enemy, for geopolitical reasons. The key was to cultivate good personal relations with Kremlin to undermine any coup attempt by Finnish communists and exercise some self-censorship to avoid provoking the Soviet Union. “Finlandization” was condemned and ridiculed in the West but has made the Finns feel secure for decades – in fact the World Happiness Report 2022 ranks them the happiest people in the world for a fifth consecutive year – even if they now feel unhappy enough with Russian aggression to be seeking NATO membership.
President Zelensky of Ukraine did not have at all a mindset of Finlandization before the Russian invasion and some observers have characterized his prior behavior as provocative. President Macron reportedly raised Finlandization as one model for Ukraine. In 2014 Henry Kissinger had already publicly suggested Finlandization as a viable option for Ukraine. Former UK Foreign Secretary Lord Owen and his colleagues responded to Kissinger at the start of the Russian invasion, stating that permanent Finlandization of Ukraine is unrealistic but a military confidence-building treaty should be established between NATO and Russia with the help of Ukraine. Finland is indeed only an example, a useful precedent that should be kept in mind. We all should do our best to ensure that Ukraine becomes the new model of peace and prosperity for itself and the world, and “Ukrainization” the new success story one will be referring to. Some further history lessons and confidence building measures offered below aim to contribute to that.
Another lesson from history is how a visionary foreign policy of a country can turn a security threat into a confidence-building process. After the tensions created by the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 the Soviet Union suggested in 1969 to European countries that a Conference on Security should be convened. Preempting a rejection of the Soviet initiative, Finland put forward a counter initiative suggesting Helsinki as venue for the Conference with expanded agenda and inviting also the US and Canada to participate.
There was strong criticism of the Finnish proposal but it gradually gathered strength and the Conference was held in Helsinki in 1975. The result was reduced tension in Europe and between the US and the Soviet Union. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) grew out of this to become the world’s largest security-oriented regional organization active in peace missions, electoral and human rights monitoring.
It is high time for a country, a group of countries and/or an international organization or a group of international organizations to propose a new process for peace and cooperation in Europe and beyond, like Finland did in 1969. And this time China should be part of it as well. The UN Secretary-General, the President of the UN General Assembly and world leaders have key roles to play in the process, if they are up to it. The process could start by examining elements for a lasting ceasefire in the Ukraine – Russia war, or could come after a ceasefire has been established with a view to strengthening the possibilities for long-term peace.
Even before a long-term process is put in place, a short-term confidence-building measure could include setting up a panel with experts from all sides to evaluate how the risks of accidental nuclear war may have increased as part of the Ukraine crisis, including delivery, early warning and command-and-control systems, and propose new safeguards. Another confidence-building measure could involve a similar panel of experts on catastrophic climate change that already affects all sides and which could focus their energies on more constructive, win-win projects.
Eventually, a new treaty between NATO and Russia will have to be negotiated, as per the proposal by Lord Owen and his colleagues. Such a treaty has already been put forward by the Putin government in December 2021. Although the sincerity and acceptability of the Russian proposals are seriously doubted especially by Western commentators, one cannot but recognize the importance of keeping the parties, Russia and Ukraine on one hand and the US, NATO and Russia on the other, engaged by means other than war. Having Russia by itself engaged in multilateral processes that recognize its major power status and pay attention to its concerns is also something one should not dismiss lightly, if there is sincere will to avoid a nuclear exchange, the likelihood of which will just increase if the war continues and escalates.
………………….
(*) –Tapio Kanninen is President of New York-based Global Crisis Information Network Inc and former Chief of Policy Planning at the UN Department of Political Affairs. He is also co-founder of Climate Leadership Coalition, a largest non-profit climate business network in Europe. While at the UN he was Head of Secretariat of Kofi Annan’s five Summits with Heads of Regional Organizations that also included military alliances like NATO. Kanninen was a Secretary and Research Focal Point of the High-level Drafting Group of “An Agenda Peace”, Boutros Boutros Ghali’s proposals for the prevention of conflicts, building peace and strengthening peacekeeping in response to the request of the first Summit of the Security Council at the level of Heads of State or Government in 1992. Kanninen was also a Convener of the Interdepartmental Working Group to implement the recommendations of An Agenda for Peace.
On UN reforms, he was Secretary of the General Assembly Working Group on the reform of the Security Council and an author of “Leadership and Reform” (Kluwer 1995) analyzing Perez de Cuellar’s reform process of the UN in the late 1980s.
After joining the UN in 1979 Kanninen organized with the UN Secretary-General’s Office, Yale, MIT and other international partners a number of seminars and workshops on preventing accidental nuclear war, a serious issue already in the 1980s. His latest book is Crisis of Global Sustainability (Routledge, 2013). He holds an MA in economics from the University of Helsinki and Ph.D. in political science from the Graduate School of the City University of New York
— Georgios Kostakos is Co-founder and Executive Director of the Foundation for Global Governance and Sustainability ( FOGGS).
About half of his thirty-year work experience Georgios spent with the United Nations (UN), including with the Executive Office UN Secretaries-General Kofi Annan and Ban Ki-moon, the High-level Panel on Global Sustainability, the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), and field missions for political affairs and human rights.
Outside the UN he has held various positions at the Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP), organized postgraduate courses at the University of Athens, was a visiting lecturer at the Brussels School of International Studies / University of Kent and served as LIFE Climate Action Sector Coordinator at NEEMO EEIG. Georgios is also the Publisher of Katoikos.world, the online magazine and community-building project of FOGGS, where he and Tapio Kanninen have also recently published on the Ukraine crisis.
How to Move From Hostility to Cooperation in the UN Security Council.
Opinion by Tapio Kanninen and Heikki Talvitie, first published in PassBlue.com on 21 November, 2022
Globalization, with its pros and cons, is broken. The world is troubled by local and regional crises, and attempts to solve them are dividing countries, both small and large, in a way that prevents a common will from emerging to solve major global crises.
Indeed, we are drifting toward a fatally dangerous situation where escalations keep rising in various armed conflicts and territorial disputes. And we do not have much time left to solve such interrelated global catastrophes as runaway global warming before large parts of our planet become uninhabitable.
Before trying to solve the crises and wars through a real willingness to negotiate, we need a positive shift in relationships among the world’s most important decision-makers. In the current atmosphere of deepening distrust, there is little hope for meaningful results.
The foremost conflict manager in the world is the United Nations. The Security Council is tasked with maintaining world peace and security for everybody’s benefit. The key decision-makers are the permanent five (P5) members, Britain, China, France, Russia and the United States, and the status of their relationships determines what the Council can achieve.
There have been times when the P5 have cooperated tremendously, including the first Security Council summit of global leaders in 1992. Similarly, when Saddam Hussein of Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990, the P5 worked in a new spirit of cooperation. The Council has also agreed on several peacekeeping and peace-building missions over the decades.
Now, like during the Cold War, the relations among the permanent members are mostly hostile, with lots of tension and blame going around. There is no sincere listening to others’ concerns and respect for diverging viewpoints and national interests. This dynamic must change, as the world expects the Security Council to play its role of maintaining international peace and security to the benefit of us all. A new spirit of cooperation could spill over to solving other common interests of humankind as well.
Over the decades, the Council, the UN secretary-general and the political side of the secretariat have instituted innovations for the Council to do its job better. We propose two urgent initiatives for further consideration:
First, the informal monthly lunch tradition between the Security Council and the secretary-general could be considerably improved. One global issue or a crisis could be the topic of the month. But the discussion should be carefully prepared to achieve a productive meeting and to avoid expressions of hostility, which would just deepen stalemates.
A respected international organization could prepare a report on the issue at hand and provide specific suggestions for solutions. Since it is important to avoid a blame game, the secretary-general should use his authority as a moderator to eliminate expressions of blame and stress that the focus should be on solutions only. No decisions would be made, but the conversations could enhance the relationships among the P5 and how they work with the 10 elected members.
An initiative calling for armistice in Ukraine was published earlier this month by the Foundation for Global Governance and Sustainability, assisted by former UN staff members and the secretariat of the InterAction Council. The call has been signed by five former heads of state or government — collectively from Costa Rica, New Zealand and Malta.
The initiative asks for a transition from a general cease-fire to a final peace settlement between Russia and Ukraine to be supervised by international institutions, notably the UN, under conditions of demilitarization of any and all occupied areas and a larger demilitarized zone of disengagement between the armed forces of the belligerents. The plan also calls for immediate efforts to be focused on repairing civilian infrastructure, including in the areas to be placed under temporary international administration, and on securing an adequate supply of food, water, health care and energy for the inhabitants.
These components of an eventual peace deal could be discussed at the monthly luncheons of the Security Council in a new spirit of cooperation as outlined above.
Second, an important tool that has not been used much in the past is Article 99 of the UN Charter. It grants the secretary-general the authority “to bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter which in his opinion may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security.” A regular use of Article 99, highlighting the leadership potential of the secretary-general to guide the dialogue and action in the Council, should become a new tradition. But it should not lead to a blame game. Instead, it should strive to find honest, serious solutions that would benefit all members of the UN.
The current situation in Ukraine and the alarming, increasing risk of the potential use of nuclear weapons would warrant invoking Article 99 as a major priority for the secretary-general. The discussion should be limited to ways to restart military confidence-building and not to discussing the origins and conduct of the war in Ukraine.
A model that could be used to show how a constructive debate by the Council to avert a nuclear war is possible are the recent nuclear risk reduction talks held by former high-level disarmament specialists from NATO countries and Russia. Seven recommendations to prevent a nuclear war and military accidents, originally drafted by a smaller expert group, were signed by 166 ex-generals, former diplomats, politicians and academics from the US, Europe and Russia in December 2020. A respected international agency, such as the Nuclear Threat Initiative, could present an analysis of the situation and suggestions for further action.
This year, after Russia’s full invasion of Ukraine and political and military escalation centered around Taiwan, the relations of the P5 have further deteriorated. Traditional diplomacy and initiatives for peace and confidence-building have been replaced by military measures, sanctions, rising nuclear and conventional deterrence and an arms race. Mutual dialogue has been replaced by condemnation and finger-pointing, sometimes expressed in moralistic terms as a struggle between good and evil, between dictatorship and democracy, tyranny and freedom.
This is a dangerous shift of international relations in an era where nuclear weapons arms control regimes are unraveling and as a climate catastrophic looms on our horizon. Our children, grandchildren and future generations deserve a far better, more secure future.
The leadership role of the UN secretary-general, as foreseen by the founders of the UN Charter, will be crucial for the future of humankind. Suggestions for strengthening his leadership, or her leadership in the future, and bold actions by current and future officeholders is badly needed in the months, years and decades to come.
A negotiated solution to the war in Ukraine should be sought more diligently
The fact that there is no clear winner in war often offers better opportunities for peace and diplomacy than complete defeat.
By Tapio Kanninen, first published in Helsingin Sanomat in Finnish as op-ed on 6 July 2022.
The mindset of a TOTAL defeat comes from the legacy of the Second World War. Germany and Japan were completely crushed, and peaceful states grew out of the ruins. But if Adolf Hitler had nuclear weapons at his disposal, wouldn’t he have used them in desperation at the end of the war? Are we putting Russian President Vladimir Putin in the same situation?
In the United States, critical perspectives on their own country’s war policy have begun to appear. Director of National Intelligence Avril Haines has warned that the threat of using nuclear weapons will increase as the war drags on. Among others, economist Jeffrey Sachs and The New York Times have criticized Joe Biden and Ukraine for their reluctance to negotiate with Russia.
A similar process would be needed now. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyi also called for a complete reform of the international security system and the United Nations when he spoke to the UN Security Council in April. Article 109 of the UN Charter also enables this process. As part of this process, the relations between NATO and Russia must be revitalized.
Just before Russia’s attack on Ukraine, former British Foreign Minister David Owen and four other foreign policy experts considered Kissinger’s previous proposal of finlandization of Ukraine unrealistic, but said that NATO could together with Ukraine propose confidence-building measures to Russia. This proposal can be returned to when serious ceasefire and peace negotiations are taking place.
The danger of an accidental nuclear war has greatly increased as a result of the war in Ukraine and will increase even more as the war drags on. A panel consisting of experts on nuclear weapons should be urgently established to assess the increased risks of nuclear war and ways to contain them. The panel could also consider further steps to revive the frozen nuclear arms control negotiations.
A similar panel is also needed to prevent an irreversible climate crisis. As a result of the war in Ukraine, several countries invest in strengthening their armed forces instead of climate action. The consumption of fossil fuels is only increasing. Finland has been active in solving the climate crisis and could also take such an initiative now.
The danger of an accidental nuclear war has increased.
A similar process would be needed now. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyi also called for a complete reform of the international security system and the United Nations when he spoke to the UN Security Council in April. Article 109 of the UN Charter also enables this process. As part of this process, the relations between NATO and Russia must be revitalized.
Just before Russia’s attack on Ukraine, former British Foreign Minister David Owen and four other foreign policy experts considered Kissinger’s previous Proposal of Finlandization of Ukraine unrealistic, but said that NATO could together with Ukraine propose confidence-building measures to Russia. This proposal can be returned to when serious ceasefire and peace negotiations are reached.
The danger of an accidental nuclear war has greatly increased as a result of the war in Ukraine and will increase even more as the war drags on. A panel consisting of experts on nuclear weapons should be urgently established to assess the increased risks of nuclear war and ways to contain them. The panel could also consider further steps to revive the frozen nuclear arms control negotiations.
A similar panel is also needed to prevent an irreversible climate crisis. As a result of the war in Ukraine, several countries invest in strengthening their armed forces instead of climate action. The consumption of fossil fuels is only increasing. Finland has been active in solving the climate crisis and could also take such an initiative now.
Tapio Kanninen
The author is the president of the New York-based Global Crisis Information Network and a former head of policy at the UN Department of Political Affairs
Towards a negotiated agreement in Ukraine
Giving peace a chance
Peace talks are possible if there is a political will to engage in them. How might this be achieved in the war between Ukraine and Russia?
By Tapio Kanninen and Heikki Patomäki, first published in Le Monde Diplomatique on Jan 2022
Calls for a negotiated peace agreement in the Ukraine war have started to grow, even in the US. In early November 2022 General Mark A Milley, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, made one such call,1 as did Charles A Kupchan, a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, who urged that ‘it’s time to bring Russia and Ukraine to the negotiating table’.2 However, no realistic terms for a possible peace deal have been elaborated.
Every peace deal is a hard compromise; in this case it needs to be acceptable both to Ukraine and Russia, in other words it must be seen to bring more benefits than losses to each, especially taking into account the failed Minsk I and II agreements. The role of the West, and in particular the US, will be decisive in convincing the victims of the invasion that peace negotiations make sense. The Ukrainians, who might insist on a total victory over the Russians to the very end, will need to receive assurances that the invasion will not rewarded and that a deal will not lead to the destabilisation of the whole international system.
There is a dangerous trend to see the war in Ukraine as a struggle between good and evil
At the same time, it must be recognised that Russia has legitimate security interests and concerns and that some of its past and present demands are reasonable. While the US and NATO rejected the new Russia-NATO and Russia-US treaties proposed by Moscow in December 2021, some of their proposals could have been negotiated and agreed to, even if others were difficult or non-starters.3 Negotiations are always possible if there is a political will to engage in them.
In 2022 a few (rare) proposals were made that could provide a basis for de-escalation and negotiation. When the Russian invasion started (in February), David Owen, Robert Skidelsky, Anthony Brenton, Cristopher Granville and Nina Krushcheva suggested in an open letter to the Financial Times that ‘it should be possible for NATO, in close association with Ukraine, to put forward detailed proposals to negotiate a new treaty with Russia that engenders no institutional hostility. This would cover: the verifiable withdrawal of nuclear-capable missiles; detailed military confidence-building measures limiting numbers and demarcating deployment; and an international agreement on presently contested
borders between Russia and Ukraine.’4
Strategy of ‘altercasting’
Going beyond that proposal, Óscar Arias and Jonathan Granoff suggested in July 2022 that NATO should start to plan and prepare for the withdrawal of all US nuclear warheads from Europe and Turkey prior to negotiations.5 Withdrawal would take place once peace terms were agreed between Ukraine and Russia. This move would not weaken NATO militarily, but the proposal would get Putin’s attention and might bring him to the negotiating table. This strategy is called ‘altercasting’: the idea is to persuade the other by positioning them differently and persuading them to act in accordance with their new role. This is how Mikhail Gorbachev dealt with Ronald Reagan in the mid-1980s.6
A ‘demilitarised zone’ and a ‘UN-managed territory’ might also be useful when considering an eventual peace deal. Demilitarisation has often been used to build a neutral zone between parties in a violent conflict; the UN has a long
history of using peacekeeping and peacebuilding to assist and administer demilitarised zones and trust territories.
The UN has also directly managed entire territories, at least temporarily, as with the UN Transitional Administration in East Timor 1999-2002. The tasks in that country included maintaining security and order, providing relief assistance,
helping to rebuild infrastructure, administering the territory based on the rule of law, and helping with the drafting of a new constitution and holding of elections.
An option that should be seriously considered is to demilitarise the contested territories in Eastern Ukraine and put them temporarily under the auspices of the UN. After a period of back-channel diplomacy and negotiations, the UN Security Council could declare, or the parties could directly negotiate, a binding ceasefire, with the deployment of a peacekeeping force and other UN personnel. The areas of Ukraine occupied by Russian forces would be demilitarised and governed temporarily by the UN, with some flexibility in specifying the boundaries of the territories.
The need for a transition period
A longer transition would be required than in East Timor: from ten to 20 years. And as eastern Ukraine is a large area, it would require substantial peacekeeping and other resources and administrative personnel. A ‘UN transitional administration of Eastern Ukraine’ would also be tasked with helping to negotiate and draft a new legal basis for the status of these regions and holding regular elections, as well as a possible referendum.
Ukraine’s military non-alignment remains a key issue and must be part of the negotiations. Moreover, as part of the core UN Security Council resolution, other confidence-building actions could be added, such as a resumption
of Russia-NATO nuclear and other military risk reduction talks and official disarmament talks.7
As in many peace deals, the warring parties need outside assistance in making the first moves towards peace. Third-party facilitators and mediators should come primarily from countries that both parties see as outsiders to the conflict and could include representatives from bodies such as the International Court of Justice or Permanent Court of Arbitration.
At present, there is a dangerous trend in international relations to see the war in Ukraine only in military and moralistic terms, as a struggle between good and evil. Diplomatic efforts to solve the conflict are few, and are even discouraged. We believe, however, that the framework we have outlined for starting negotiations could contribute to de-escalation – and to giving peace a chance.
Tapio Kanninen is president of the Global Crisis Information Network (New York) and former chief of policy planning at the UN Department of Political Affairs; Heikki Patomäki is Professor of World Politics and Global Political Economy at the University of Helsinki
1 Peter Baker, ‘Top US general urges diplomacy in Ukraine while Biden advisers resist’, The New York Times, 10 November 2022
2 Charles A Kupchan, ‘It’s time to bring Russia and Ukraine to the negotiating table’, The New York Times, 2 November 2022
3 See Tuomas Forsberg and Heikki Patomäki, Debating the War in Ukraine: Counterfactual Histories and Future Possibilities, Routledge, 2023
4 Lord Owen and others, ‘Letter: Remember Kissinger’s advice to the Ukrainians’, Financial Times, London, 28 February 2022
5 Óscar Arias and Jonathan Granoff, ‘Nuclear strategy and ending the war in Ukraine’, The Hill 19 July 2022
6 Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, Cambridge University Press, 1999
7 In December 2020 a high-level group of 145 former generals, politicians, ex-diplomats and academics from the US, Europe and Russia, all concerned about increasing risks of nuclear and other military accidents, signed a report entitled ‘Recommendations of the Expert Dialogue on NATO-Russia Military Risk Reduction in Europe’. The talks continued in a smaller group but have essentially been moribund after the Russian invasion of Ukraine.